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Brain readiness and the nature of
language
Denis Bouchard*
Département de linguistique, Université du Québec à Montréal, Montreal, QC, Canada
To identify the neural components that make a brain ready for language, it is important
to have well defined linguistic phenotypes, to know precisely what language is. There
are two central features to language: the capacity to form signs (words), and the
capacity to combine them into complex structures. We must determine how the human
brain enables these capacities. A sign is a link between a perceptual form and a
conceptual meaning. Acoustic elements and content elements, are already brain-internal
in non-human animals, but as categorical systems linked with brain-external elements.
Being indexically tied to objects of the world, they cannot freely link to form signs. A crucial
property of a language-ready brain is the capacity to process perceptual forms and
contents offline, detached from any brain-external phenomena, so their “representations”
may be linked into signs. These brain systems appear to have pleiotropic effects on
a variety of phenotypic traits and not to be specifically designed for language. Syntax
combines signs, so the combination of two signs operates simultaneously on their
meaning and form. The operation combining the meanings long antedates its function in
language: the primitive mode of predication operative in representing some information
about an object. The combination of the forms is enabled by the capacity of the brain to
segment vocal and visual information into discrete elements. Discrete temporal units have
order and juxtaposition, and vocal units have intonation, length, and stress. These are
primitive combinatorial processes. So the prior properties of the physical and conceptual
elements of the sign introduce combinatoriality into the linguistic system, and from these
primitive combinatorial systems derive concatenation in phonology and combination in
morphosyntax. Given the nature of language, a key feature to our understanding of the
language-ready brain is to be found in the mechanisms in human brains that enable the
unique means of representation that allow perceptual forms and contents to be linked
into signs.
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Introduction
The main point of this paper is that the central trait of human language is the capacity to form
signs by linking perceptual forms and meanings1. This predicts that the core mechanisms that
make a brain ready for language are those that enable this capacity. Moreover, switching from
a computational view of language to a sign-based theory provides a unified approach to the
1This paper presents the main hypotheses exposed in Bouchard (2013). I have therefore borrowed substantially from that text
without indicating it by quotation marks or references in order not to overburden the readers.
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functioning of the main subsystems of language. The perceptual
and conceptual substances of signs create a system that reaches a
level of such complexity that it triggers self-organization, deriving
specific properties of signs, as well as the basic structuring of
language in its phonology, semantics, and syntax.
The Core Competence for Language
A language-ready brain raises two evolutionary puzzles: a puzzle
of emergence and a puzzle of design (Hoefler, 2009, p. 1). The
puzzle of emergence addresses the problem of bridging the gap
from a stage where our ancestors had no language to a stage
where they had language as we know it today. How and why did
language emerge in humans and not in other species?
Lewontin (1998) raises strong doubts about the possibility
of reconstructing the evolutionary history and the causal
mechanisms of the acquisition of linguistic competence (and
cognition in general). He emphasizes the near impossibility to
come up with evidence “that there was heritable variation for,
say, linguistic ability, in our remote ancestors when the human
species was still evolving into its present form and that those
who possessed this ability, in the remote past, left more offspring
by virtue of that ability” (p. 111). So it is extremely difficult for
the standard theory of evolution by natural selection to inform
us on how language, and more generally, cognition arose and
spread and changed. As he points out, humans had an ancestor
in common with the chimpanzee and the gorilla about 10 million
years ago. So 20 million years of evolution separate us from
our closest relatives. During that period, “a major difference
in the consequences of cognitive power has taken place during
human evolution that makes the cognitive difference between
gorillas and chimpanzees trivial compared to our cognitive
distance from them” (p. 116). Evolved forms may diverge very
dramatically in a relatively short period of time. Lewontin gives
the example of cows, goats, and deer that differentiated 10million
years ago. Therefore, it is unlikely that we can determine—
even approximately—when our linguistic capacity emerged in
our ancestry. In addition, a trait may derive from analogy just
as well as from homology. Moreover, we cannot measure the
actual reproductive advantages of cognition or language. Fossils,
furthermore, are of very little help concerning cognition, and
often we cannot even be sure whether a fossil is from an ancestor
or some relative on another branch of the bush-like relations
between species. So we cannot tell what our immediate non-
linguistic ancestors were like cognitively. Almost two decades
after the publication of his paper, the problem still appears to
be substantial, though advances in our knowledge of genes open
some research avenues concerning heritable variation, even for
remote ancestors.
Nevertheless, there is room for testable theories about what
language is, what brain mechanisms this requires, and whether
some of these brain mechanisms are unique to humans at
least compared to other current species. As we progress in our
understanding of the human brain, we can compare it with the
neuro-anatomy of related species and see how they differ in
form and function. We can pinpoint some current neurological
distinctive trait(s) that enable(s) language, and hence determine
WHATmade language emerge. RegardingWHEN and HOW the
organism evolved to get that change, we can only speculate. But at
least we can elaborate a theory that passes the test of evolvability:
if a theory can show how some actual neuro-anatomical element
enables language as we know it, then that theory is in accord
with the fact that an organism with a language-ready brain is an
evolvable organism, because this neuro-anatomical element can
indeed develop according to the laws and principles of biological
evolution, since it exists in human brains. Moreover, the nature
of the neuro-anatomical trait can give us an indication of what
it could have come from. This is particularly the case if language
is a side effect of the neuro-anatomical trait, as I argue below: the
other functional effects of the trait can further restrict the possible
scenarios.
This brings us to the second evolutionary puzzle, the question
of design: how and why did language evolve with the properties
that we observe rather than some other set? To identify the
components thatmake a brain ready for language, neuroscientists
must know precisely what such a brainmust do, hence ultimately,
what language is. Not that the brain mechanisms will somehow
be analogical to the functional aspects of language: examples
abound where it has been shown that the neural substrates
or the mechanisms supporting behavior, are not predicted by
psychological models. However, we must understand precisely
what language is and have well-defined linguistic phenotypes to
search for the neural substrates that enable these phenotypes.
There are numerous properties that have been attributed to
language. Many have been recently proposed and many are
not widely accepted because they depend on narrow theoretical
assumptions. It would be a formidable task to look at hundreds
of properties in exploring the language-readiness of the brain,
and probably futile in many instances since the properties are
probably ephemeral. It is more productive to investigate two
properties of language for which there is a long-standing and
broad consensus among scholars—the capacity to form signs
(words, morphemes), and the capacity to combine them into
complex structures:
“at least two basic problems arise when we consider the origins of
the faculty of language [...]: first, the core semantics of minimal
meaning-bearing elements, including the simplest of them; and
second, the principles that allow infinite combinations of symbols,
hierarchically organized, which provide the means for use of
language in its many aspects” (Chomsky, 2005, p. 4).
If we can explain how the brain is ready for these two basic
properties, how it enables them, we are heading in the right
direction. However, if we consider what the founder of the
most prominent theoretical model in linguistics says about the
evolution of these two properties, the prospects look rather dim.
Concerning the capacity to form signs, Chomsky (2010) says
that it is “of totally mysterious origin.” Moreover, though he has
contributed to a very influential paper on the origin of linguistic
combinatoriality (Hauser et al., 2002), Chomsky and some of his
colleagues now believe that the origin of combinatoriality is also a
mystery, as indicated in the very title of their paper: “The mystery
of language evolution” (Hauser et al., 2014).
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The problem is further amplified by the fact that, despite
recent attempts to limit it, the current model still relies on a large
set of innate, language-specific conditions—Universal Grammar
(UG)—which is a repertory of unexplained properties (Chomsky,
2007, p. 19)2. UG is therefore a highly problematic component
from an explanatory point of view, since the richer the set of
language-specific brain features, the harder it will be to account
for it: “Aspects of the computational system that do not yield to
principled explanation fall under UG, to be explained somehow
in other terms [my emphasis, DB], questions that may lie beyond
the reach of contemporary inquiry, Lewontin (1998) has argued”
(Chomsky, 2007, p. 24). This is as close as one can get to
saying that UG is also an unsolved mystery, maybe even an
unsolvable one3.
The three mysteries are not simply subcases of the difficulty to
reconstruct evolutionary history and the causal mechanisms of
the acquisition of linguistic competence: they are also problems
of evolvability. The UG model appears incapable of providing
a principled explanation based on some neuro-anatomical
elements that would account for the numerous language-specific
components it postulates. Brain readiness and evolvability are
closely linked, so evolvability is an important test for linguistic
theories: the traits that a linguistic theory requires of the human
brain must be highly plausible according to the known laws and
principles of biological evolution.Wemay not be able to trace the
evolutionary path of how language emerged, but we can evaluate
the degree of evolvability of a linguistic model, its plausibility
given known laws of evolution.
2For instance, here is an illustrative sample of UG elements taken mostly from
Hornstein and Boeckx (2009) and Narita and Fujita (2010):
- endocentricity labeling;
- c-command;
- uninterpretable features and specifications about which elements they may
attach to and when;
- numerous functional categories;
- an intractable number of micro or macro parameters distributed over different
modules;
- binding conditions for pronouns;
- displacement;
- agreement;
- constituency;
- cycle/phase bounding nodes;
- Phase Impenetrability;
- Transfer;
- locality conditions (Ross’s Problem: why locality holds for Move but not
pronominalization);
- condition on theta assignment: arguments must be initially merged in theta-
positions;
- Linearize: there has to be a procedure Linearize, with something like the Linear
Correspondence Axiom (Kayne, 1994) to constrain it.
3Moreover, the UG problem has actually increased, since analyses in that model
have drifted toward a constant increase in functional categories (to wit, the
cartography approach, Cinque, 1994, 1999, 2002; Belletti, 2004; Rizzi, 2004 and
nano-syntax Kayne, 2010). Most of these functional categories are redundant
system-internal correlates (there are functional categories of SIZE, COLOR,
ORIGIN, etc. because there are adjectives of those categories): they add nothing
to our understanding of the facts. They are not even discovered correlations but
invented correlations, elements added to the theory solely to correspond to some
phenomenon (much in the behaviorist way so fiercely criticized in Chomsky’s, 1959
review of Skinner; see the discussion in Bouchard, 2001).
In the face of the triple mystery assessment, we might judge
that the evolvability of the language-ready brain is too hard
a problem and decide to simply drop it. But scientists don’t
like to give up. If the problem appears insurmountable from
the perspective a theory, however widely scholars adhere to it,
its apparent incapacity to deal with such core issues as signs,
combinatoriality and language-specific conditions in general,
can be a motive to scrutinize that theory to figure out why it
fails in this respect, and to use this assessment to elaborate an
alternative model that can adequately address the core issues.
Proponents of UG, and those who share the mystery assessment
about language such as Lewontin (1998), all put a high emphasis
on the property of discrete infinity found in language, which
is assumed to be the core property of the language phenotype:
“the core competence for language is a biological capacity
shared by all humans and distinguished by the central feature
of discrete infinity—the capacity for unbounded composition
of various linguistic objects into complex structures” (Hauser
et al., 2014, p. 2). This is understandable from a historical
background. Generative grammar was born in the context of
emerging tools in mathematical logic. For the first time, these
tools provided the means to formalize recursion, which had been
informally recognized as a property of language for some time
(cf. Humboldt’s infinite use of finite means). In this context, the
most striking characteristic of human language is its discrete
infinity. It is tempting to see discrete infinity as an essential
property of language, and to put the corresponding technical
tools of recursion at the heart of the model. It is then natural to
assume that recursion is the crucial distinctive property of human
language.
But this core assumption leads to a triple mystery. We should
therefore question that assumption. The language phenotype, like
all “facts,” is a set of observational propositions which are part of
the theory: they are not external to the theory and independent
(Lakatos, 1970), and their status can be questioned like any
other proposition, particularly in the face of an overwhelming
problem such as when a theory leads to a shroud of mysteries.
It turns out that the assumption of the centrality of recursion and
discrete infinity, though shared by many language scientists, is
incorrect. Although it is an observable trait of language, it is not
the core phenotype it is assumed to be, but a side effect. The core
competence for language is the capacity to take elements from
two substances with no logical or natural connection between
their elements—perceptual forms and meanings—and to link
them into signs (words, morphemes). This capacity to form
Saussurean signs is the sole distinctive trait of human language.
The fact that only human language has discrete infinity does
not imply that recursion is a distinguishing mechanism. This
mechanism is uniquely human; however, it is not original: it
actually arises from prior elements of the two substances of signs
that contain primitive combinatorial processes and produce the
effects of recursion4.
4In this paper, I compare my view with that of Chomsky, since it is the most
influential one. There are many other theories of language and its origin, some
of which relate to the brain and machinery prior to language. Because of space
limitations, I cannot do them justice here, so I refer the interested readers to the
extended discussion of other approaches in Bouchard (2013).
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To see this, let us now turn to the detailed properties of
linguistic signs.
The Sign Theory of Language
A linguistic sign is generally presented as involving two
elements—a meaning and a form—and a link between the two.
Saussure (1916) introduced the terms signified and signifier
to emphasize that this linking is purely mental, established by
speakers. I use the terms “concept” and “percept” in this spirit:
they are dynamical mental creations, cognitive structures (see
Jackendoff, 2002, ch. 10). This is an oversimplification, however.
A linguistic form (signifier/percept) is a mental state linked to
an acoustic/visual material element: this element is not linguistic
but in the domain of the sciences that deal with the physical
and mental properties of acoustic perception and production
(Henceforth, I will only discuss acoustic material of the oral
modality, but the ideas carry over to the gestural modality).
Similarly, a linguistic meaning (signified/concept) is a mental
state linked to a psychological element, a chunk of cognition
that the mental state evokes: this element also is not linguistic
but in the domain of the sciences that deal with psychological
phenomena related to thought. It is only when a language
establishes Link 1 between a representation of a perceptual
element and a representation of a conceptual element that these
are linguistically relevant and become a signifier and a signified.
(1) Figure 1
FIGURE 1 | The structure of a linguistic sign. (A) shows the structure of
the word “little.” Its linguistic elements are its meaning (here simply represented
as LITTLE), which is related to the combination of phonemes that are its form.
These linguistic elements are each related to elements outside the realm of
language: a certain chunk of cognition for the meaning LITTLE, and physical
sound waves for its form. (B) shows the structure corresponding to the word
“star.”
The linguistically crucial part of a sign is a reciprocal
predication: it is the systematic attribution of a vocal form and a
meaning to each other. The link between signifier and signified is
not determined by logic or by intrinsic properties in the nature
of the phonic-acoustic or conceptual substances: it is purely
linguistic. The properties of the substances to which the signifiers
and signifieds are linked cannot explain why a particular phonetic
entity is tagged as the signifier of a certain meaning or why a
particular conceptual entity is tagged as the signified of a certain
form. These links are not due to natural causes, but rather are
arbitrary because the nature of the sounds that our phonatory
articulators produce and the nature of the concepts that our
conceptual system constructs are so different that they cannot
entertain ameaningful, logical, or iconic relation (Saussure, 1916,
pp. 155–156).
Now consider syntax. If we look at it in terms as neutral as
possible, syntax is minimally defined as the processes by which
signs are combined. Consider a simple example of the syntactic
combination of the two signs little and star. Each sign is complex
by definition—a form resulting from the union of a signified
and a signifier. Syntax does not combine just signifiers or just
signifieds, it combines relations between signifiers and signifieds,
i.e., signs. Since signified and signifier are irreducibly united, any
operation applying to one is reflected on the other. So when two
signs are combined by a relation R, R operates simultaneously
on both their signifieds and their signifiers, as shown in the
combination of little and star in (2).
(2) Figure 2
FIGURE 2 | The structure of a combinatorial sign. A syntactic
combination of words such as little and star is realized by a combinatorial sign
which operates simultaneously on their meanings, creating a relation R(CI) at
the conceptual-intentional level, and on their forms, creating a relation R(SM)
at the sensory-motor level.
Since R operates simultaneously on both the signifieds and the
signifiers of the signs in (2), it is itself a sign. I will refer to this set
of signs that combine syntactic elements as combinatorial signs
(C-signs), to distinguish them from the more familiar unit signs
(U-signs), namely words/morphemes. This immediately raises
two questions: What is the signifier of a C-sign? What is the
signified of a C-sign? As already indicated in Bouchard (1996,
2002), the signifier of a C-sign will take whatever form a language
arbitrarily selects from among those that our physiology provides
as a combinatorial percept in themodality of that language. These
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forms are drawn from physical traits of the forms of words.
For instance, a first trait in an oral language is that vocal units
appear linearly ordered. So signifiers made up of these vocal units
can share a temporal edge—they can be temporally juxtaposed:
two signifiers can be ordered next to one another, and this can
be grammatically significant in the system of a language. For
instance, in (3), it is grammatically significant that saw and John
are juxtaposed, but not that John and yesterday are juxtaposed:
the juxtaposition of yesterday is grammatically relevant only with
respect to the phrase saw John (orMary saw John under different
assumptions).
(3) Mary saw John yesterday.
The order of juxtaposition is also frequently significant, as in the
pairs in (4):
(4) a. John saw Mary—Mary saw John
b. John is sick—Is John sick?
A second trait is that the two signifiers can share a temporal
space, as when a modulation is superimposed on the phonemes
of a constituent: one signifier is the intonation placed on the
other signifier, such as an intonation expressing a question (4b).
Other possible superimposed elements are stress and length5. All
these combinatorial percepts depend on the physiological traits
of the modality, so they vary across modalities. For instance,
the visual–gestural channel of sign languages has more types
of combinatorial percepts because it uses more articulators and
more dimensions than the auditory–oral channel (Bouchard,
1996).
The set of possible signifiers for a C-sign is extremely restricted
because the set of physiological relational vocal percepts is small.
So arbitrariness is limited by what are ultimately principles of
physical science, as Thompson (1917) anticipated for biological
systems in general. Languages vary in their choices of signifiers
among these combinatorial percepts, as expected in the light
of arbitrariness. For instance, the syntactic relation “direct
object” can be expressed by any of these combinatorial signifiers:
juxtaposition in the order V-NP or NP-V, a Case affix or a
Case tone on the complement, an object affix or an object tone
on the verb. This follows from Saussure’s general principle of
arbitrariness. There is no “reason of nature” for a language—
let alone all languages—to choose any particular combinatorial
signifier among those enabled by our physiology: any signifier
is a possible candidate, because each one can optimally satisfy
the requirement to encode meanings in a form. Indeed, each
possibility is instantiated in some language or other. Languages
choose from among the various possibilities of combinatorial
signs, just as they arbitrarily choose from among the various
possibilities of unit signs. Which combinatorial percepts are
possible signifiers is not stipulated in some universal list, but is
determined by prior properties of the perceptual substance of
the modality of the particular language. Under this view, if there
was no variation in the way languages express a relation such as
5In addition to these very direct ways of indicating that there is a relation between
two signs, we can also indicate that a relation is being established between two
percepts by physically shaping one in a conventionalized way, in a paradigm that
indicates what relation is being established with the other, as with Case marking or
agreement.
“direct object,” if they all had the same signifier for it, this would
be a most improbable accident, just as it would be if the signifier
of a unit sign happened to be the same in all languages. Since
Saussurean arbitrariness extends to C-signs, variation in syntax is
a virtual necessity. Consequently, which particular combinatorial
signifier is used in any specific case in a language must be learned
just as much as any signifier at the word level. The numerous
instances in which each language must choose a C-sign create the
impression that languages can be amazingly different. But this is
just an impression due to the cumulative effect of the choices;
in fact, each choice of C-sign involves only one of the very few
percepts that human physiology allows as the signifier of a C-sign.
Though each combination is very simple, these combinatorial
means cumulatively allow syntax to create organized groups of
signs which can attain a very high degree of complexity overall.
Consider now the nature of the meaning of a C-sign, that is,
the relation R at the conceptual-intentional level. The signified
of R is a relation of predication. Predication, namely the capacity
to attribute properties/information to objects, is a universal trait
of human cognition. As Hurford (2007a, p. 527) indicates, “In
the very earliest mental processes, long antedating language,
binary structure can be found, with components that one can
associate with the functions of identifying or locating an object
and representing some information about it.”
In a combination of signs as in (2), the semantic part of the
C-sign links two elements so that one adds its denotation as a
restriction on the other, either in the usual sense for subject–
predicate and topic–comment relations, as in (5), or in the sense
of saturation, as in (6).
(5) a. John is sick/left early (the property of the VP is attributed
to the subject).
b. that book, I really liked (the property of the comment is
attributed to the topic).
(6) a. liked that book (the property of the direct object is
attributed to the V, it saturates the verb).
b. in the kitchen (the property of the Noun Phrase is
attributed to the locative preposition).
In summary, syntax is a set of combinatorial signs that allow
the formation of complex signs. The perceptual form of a C-
sign can only be either a juxtaposition or a superimposition of
a vocal (or gestural) percept; this limitation on the combinatorial
signifiers is due to properties of the human sensorimotor systems.
The signified of a C-sign is predication, which was exapted
from the pre-linguistic cognitive system of humans. Like other
signs, combinatorial signs are subject to arbitrariness due to the
nature of the two substances that they link. Therefore, which
combinatorial signifier a language chooses for any particular
predicative relation (i.e., “construction”) is arbitrarily selected
from among those permitted by its modality. These are the main
tenets of the Sign Theory of Language.
The Kind of Brain Mechanisms Required
for the Formation of Signs
A sign is a link between elements from domains of
very different natures—a physical/perceptual form and a
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psychological/conceptual meaning. The core problem is to
identify the brain mechanisms that enable links between these
two kinds of elements. This neurological property (or set of
properties) must be unique to the human brain since only
humans have words: no other animal comes close to having
equivalent signs detached from the immediate environment and
as productively created. In Bouchard (2013), I suggest that these
neuronal systems must have properties similar to the uniquely
human systems of neurons discussed by Hurley (2008). These
systems have the capacity to operate oﬄine for input as well
as output: they can be triggered not only by external events
stimulating our perceptual systems but also by brain-internal
events (including counterfactuals); they can also be activated
while inhibiting output to any external (motoric) system. These
Oﬄine Brain Systems (OBS) are not specifically designed for
language but they provide the crucial trait.
As early as 1891, Saussure understood that the fundamental
duality of language is not in the linking of sound and meaning,
but “resides in the duality of the vocal phenomenon AS SUCH,
and of the vocal phenomenon AS A SIGN—of the physical
fact (objective) and of the physical-mental fact (subjective)”
(quoted in Bouquet and Engler, 2002, p. 20). The question is in
what way, exclusive to humans, the vocal phenomenon enters
into the mental domain, into the brain. Non-human animals
can correctly classify and appropriately respond to stimuli, so
acoustic elements, as well as informative content elements, are
already brain-internal, but as categorical systems linked with
brain-external elements. Being indexically tied to objects of
the world, they are restricted in their mental activations and
they cannot freely undergo linkings, they cannot form signs.
Something different must be present in human brains. The brain
mechanisms we are looking for must enable a vocal sound to
be represented in the brain in a way detached from any brain-
external phenomenon, as a purely brain-dependent entity, an
activation of an OBS or something similar. Consequently, these
representations of percepts can be arbitrarily linked to concepts:
they can function as signifiers. I refer to these neural systems as
Detached Representation systems (DR systems).
In addition to the physical element of a sign becoming a purely
mental representation, the informational content of a sign is also
different from that of an animal communication system unit. The
content of an ACS unit is a category, i.e., a neural linking of
similar results from sensory input, a class of input stimuli. This
level is still linked to perceptual input—to the outside world. Even
the signals that apes learn through intensive training remain at
the level of action observation and embodied simulation of action
triggered by external events. The content of a linguistic sign is at
a more abstract level. It comes from human-specific cognemes
that are abstracted from any sensory input or immediacy. This is
the level at which detachment is attained. The concepts/meanings
of signs do not represent or stand in for outer objects, but are
brain activations that take internal events as inputs. This notion
of “concept” is similar to the “amodal symbols” of Barsalou (1999)
and the “types” of Penn et al. (2008):
“[...] only humans form general categories based on
structural rather than perceptual criteria, find analogies between
perceptually disparate relations, draw inferences based on the
hierarchical or logical relation between relations, cognize the
abstract functional role played by constituents in a relation
as distinct from the constituents’ perceptual characteristics, or
postulate relations involving unobservable causes such as mental
states and hypothetical physical forces. There is not simply a
consistent absence of evidence for any of these higher-order
relational operations in nonhuman animals; there is compelling
evidence of an absence” (Penn et al., 2008, p. 110).
In order to be able to form linguistic signs, humans had to
evolve brain systems that enable a more abstract representational
level, so that concepts and percepts can be linked. It is not a
percept per se that is linked with a concept per se in a linguistic
sign, but a representation of the percept and a representation
of the concept, i.e., a mental state corresponding to each of
them, as we saw in figure (1). The crucial innovation is in
the way some human neuronal systems function. Language
did not emerge because there was environmental pressure
for better communication or thought organization (though it
brought leverage for both). It is not a system with a function
of communication that emerged, nor with the function of
organizing thought. It is a system of signs that emerged because
elements from two very different substances met in the brain via
their representations by new neuronal systems.
If the known laws of biology are extrapolated, we expect these
brain systems to be in continuity with neuronal systems that are
part of the machinery of the pre-linguistic brain, i.e., the brain
of a prehuman species that has not yet achieved the capacity
for detachment of the sort discussed above. Given biological
continuity, it is likely that these are not radically different
systems, but rather that they are oﬄine activations of systems
involving neurons in essentially the same parts of the brain.
In Bouchard (2013), I conjecture that these systems developed
this novel kind of activation due to an increase in synaptic
interactions that was triggered by several compounding factors. A
large brain with a huge cortex offers a greatly increased potential
for synaptic interactions. In addition, the more globular shape
of the brain, with the thalamus in the middle, affords more
cross-modular interactions (Boeckx, 2012). Moreover, alleles
such as ApoE4 significantly improve synaptic repair; hence, they
dramatically increase synaptic interactions. In addition, the long
dependency during infancy feeds more cultural material into
these additional brain capacities. With such a massive increase in
synaptic interactions and complexity of circuitry due to biological
changes and extensive cultural stimulation, a critical level was
reached in hominid brains; some neuronal systems started being
triggered by strictly internal brain events, introducing a new form
of oﬄine activation with no link to external events related to
sensory inputs ormotoric outputs. These strictly internal (oﬄine)
activations of some micro-anatomical structures represent a
small evolutionary step: like the latching discussed by Russo and
Treves (2011), they occur without altering the make-up of the
neuronal network or any of its constituent properties. But DR
systems have gigantic consequences: they enable brain activity of
a novel kind and complexity, a unique representational capability
that leads to higher level mentalizing.
The dramatic increases in both the number of neurons and the
number connections between neuronal networks are instances
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where quantity produces quality, the brain activity becoming
less input-driven and less rigid. It is not obvious that there is
an immediate functional behavioral advantage for an individual
to have this kind of detached brain activity. It can slow down
reactions to the immediate environment, creating a sort of
framing problem. From our current perspective, we see a quality
in the innovation; but it may have come only in the long run—
part of the pleiotropy of the innovation in brain activation
that occurs due to material design, with no teleological push
for an improvement of the individual’s immediate well-being.
Enhancements in the number of neurons and of connections lead
to an increase in computational abilities and internal activity, but
have little effect on the link between the brain and the perceptual
systems interacting with the outer world. This kind of system
does not evolve due to functional pressures: it takes on functions
after its emergence. As Gould and Lewontin (1979) remark, a trait
is not necessarily for something: it can just be a consequence.
This considerable upgrade in the quantity and quality of brain
activity is like duplication in genes: other areas/systems can take
over (Deacon, 2006), particularly given that the novel functional
property of these micro-anatomical structures is less specialized,
not tied to particular systems related to perception, but has
a general representational capacity. Consequently, the various
brain operations related to these systems are expected to exhibit
great plasticity, with their anatomical location being diffuse. This
is another feature that neuroscientists should be looking for.
Though, it may not be possible to reconstruct the evolutionary
history of the causal factors for the brain systems that enable the
formation of linguistic signs, we can nevertheless test whether
such systems actually exist and whether they exhibit some of the
predicted properties, such as plasticity and pleiotropy. There is
already evidence in support of the hypothesis.
Concerning the existence of these oﬄine systems, we can
see them at work in language once we isolate their effects
from those of other activities concurrent with language at
the motoric and conceptual levels. For instance, Meister and
Iacoboni (2007) report on an experiment in which they compare
the processing of visual stimuli while performing an action
perception task and two linguistic tasks. They did not find any
area specifically activated or with higher activity during the two
linguistic tasks: “when visual stimuli concerning object-oriented
actions are processed perceptually, they activate a large bilateral
fronto-parietal network. When the same stimuli are processed
linguistically, they activate only a subset of this network and no
additional areas” (p. 6). They argue that these results support “the
evolutionary hypothesis that neural mechanisms for language in
humans co-opted phylogenetically older fronto-parietal neurons
concerned with action perception” (p. 6). The identification of
neural systems involved in language, and their role, is extremely
difficult. As Dehaene and Cohen (2007) point out, module
sharing may involve all levels of brain hierarchic organizations:
micro-maps (millimeter-size columns), meso-maps (centimeter-
size circuits), and macro-maps (larger-size networks). But with
the rapid progress in technology to probe the brain, scientists
can refine the testing of linguistic properties relating to neural
systems, and eventually put the hypothesis to a test.
Regarding plasticity, Hein and Knight (2008) provide
evidence that the same brain region can support different
cognitive operations (theory of mind, audiovisual integration,
motion processing, speech processing, and face processing)
depending on task-dependent network connections (see also
Bookheimer, 2002, p. 153). There is no fixed macro-anatomical
structure that is exclusively dedicated to language: linguistic
processing is a widespread property of the neural networks
(Fedor et al., 2009). Language exhibits extensive plasticity for the
localization of its components between and within individuals
(Neville and Bavelier, 1998), during its development (Karmiloff-
Smith, 2006), in its repair (Hagoort, 2009), and depending on
its modality (Neville, 1993; Mayberry, 2002). The often-noted
association between human praxis and language also points in the
same direction. There is a genetic linkage between handedness
and language dominance, and clinical correlations between
aphasia and apraxia (Donald, 1998).
Regarding pleiotropy, if human brains have systems of
neurons that are functionally less specialized, systems that can
be activated in absentia, triggered by representations of events
instead of the events themselves, and produce representations of
events with no brain-external realization, then we should find
evidence for this capacity in other functional traits unique to
humans. There is compelling evidence that several interrelated
traits are uniquely human, and absent or in very rudimentary
forms in other animals (e.g., Premack, 2004; Penn et al., 2008;
Fedor et al., 2009). This Human-specific Adaptive Suite extends
across many domains and involves qualitatively huge differences
from species that are closely related to us. Here is an indicative
list, with a few of the relevant references.
Human-specific cognitive traits
1. Language: signs and syntactic combinations
2. Imitation (Meltzoff and Moore, 1997; Rizzolatti and
Craighero, 2004; Karmiloff-Smith, 2006)
3. Advanced Theory of Mind (Flavell, 1992; Povinelli, 2000)
4. Detachment from immediate situation, episodic memory (of
noncurrent scenes and events) (Gärdenfors and Osvath, 2005)
5. Object permanence (Hurford, 2007b)
Human-specific neurological traits
6. Brain with large amount of neurons and increased
connectivity (Russo and Treves, 2011, Deacon, unpublished)
7. ApoE4 (apolipoprotein E4) (provides better synaptic
interactions) (Bufill and Carbonell, 2004) and other proteins
with effects on language (Fitch et al., 2010)
8. Plasticity of the brain for several functions (Fedor et al., 2009;
Hagoort, 2009)
9. Oﬄine Brain Systems (oﬄine activations, inhibiting input or
output) (Hurley, 2008)
The human-specific cognitive and neurological traits are so
closely linked that several scholars assume that at least a
good part of them coevolved synergistically from a common
factor underlying these various cognitive modules (Szathmáry,
2008; Fedor et al., 2009). Some assume that the underlying
supermodule is one of the functional modules, the two most
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popular being Theory of Mind and language. However, Penn
et al. (2008) argue compellingly that the suite of discontinuities
between human and non-human minds cannot be explained
by relating an explanans directly to the functioning of these
cognitive domains. (See Bouchard, 2013, pp. 113–114) for
arguments against the language-first and ToM-first hypotheses).
The Human-specific Adaptive Suite provides initial evidence
for a neurobiological innovation with general representational
potential. Given the limitations in the current techniques
available, the specifics of many of these traits are still unclear,
but they may ultimately help us resolve the problem of the neural
basis of sign formation.
Though this is difficult, the hypothesis can nevertheless be
tested. One useful line of inquiry can be found in recent
experiments by Stanislas Dehaene and Laurent Cohen (Dehaene,
2005; Dehaene and Cohen, 2007). They show that some
adaptations can occur much faster than is expected on a genetic
scale, due to a process that they call “neuronal recycling”
that operates during cultural acquisitions such as reading and
arithmetic. They observe that part of the human cortex is
specialized for these two cultural domains. Since invention of
these cultural activities is too recent to have influenced the
evolution of our species, they hypothesize that this specialization
results from neuronal recycling: reading and writing are not
genetically encoded, but they nevertheless find their niche in a
well-suited set of neural circuits.
Note that under the hypothesis that the novel brain systems
coincidentally allowed mental states corresponding to elements
of the perceptual and conceptual substances to meet in our brains
to form linguistic signs, this does not raise what Chomsky (2005,
2007, 2010, 2011) refers to as the Jacob-Luria problem. Though
he accepts that pressures to communicate may have played a role
in the gradual fine-tuning of language, Chomsky has repeatedly
claimed that, at its origin, language could not have evolved due to
communicative pressures because this raises a problem:
(7) Luria/Jacob problem: How can a mutation that brings
about a better communication system provide any survival
advantage to the first single individual who gets it?
A mutation occurs in a single individual, whereas
communication takes place between individuals6. Under
my hypothesis, the oﬄine systems with general representational
capacity took on this other function of linking percepts and
concepts after they were in place due to a suite of evolutionary
pressures. The Luria/Jacob problem does not arise in this
approach because the change was not for language or any of
its functions like communication or organizing thought. The
change produced oﬄine systems. Linguistic signs are a side
effect of this neurobiological property. Even if it depended
on a mutation (but I doubt this to be the case as indicated
above), the new trait could spread in a population because it has
evolvability of its own, and all the members of that group are
then brain-ready for the innovative side effect when it occurs:
6Pinker (1994: 365), foreseeing the objection, counters that the initial grammar
mutant could talk to the 50% of brothers and sisters, and sons and daughters, who
shared the new gene.
by the time words come around, they can be understood by
conspecifics.
The advent of some kind of DR system is the crucial small
change that made a big difference. This provided the core
biological mechanism of the language phenotype—the capacity
to link percepts and concepts into signs. Given this capacity and
the prior properties of the two substances of the elements linked
by signs, the rest of the linguistic properties follow without the
need of any additional language-specific rules or conditions. In
the next sections, I show how this happens in the three core
components of grammar: phonology, semantics, and syntax.
Before turning to these issues, an important question remains
to be addressed. Once humans had the capacity to form a
limitless number of signs, they developed a capacity to learn and
remember a vast set of such signs. How exactly this additional
capacity depends on the mechanisms of the first capacity is a
question that can now be asked, given my hypothesis. If I am
correct in supposing that the DR system is likely to be (part of)
what provides humans with a more advanced Theory of Mind
(such as a shared attentionmechanism and ameta-representation
of others’ mental states, Baron-Cohen, 1995), and if it also turns
out to be correct that word learning strongly depends on an
advanced ToM (Bloom, 2000), then the DR system would be
crucial for both the capacity to form signs and the capacity to
learn and remember them. See the discussion in section 9.5 of
Bouchard (2013) and references therein.
Contrastive Dispersion of Percepts and
Combinatorial Phonology
As is the case in other biological systems, DR systems are
complemented by epigenetic self-organizing constraints that
emerge from interactions among properties of building materials
that limit adaptive scope and channel evolutionary patterns
(Jacob, 1982; Erwin, 2003). Since the linguistic linking between
a percept and a concept is arbitrary—that is, it is not hard-
wired butmade possible by their representations in DR systems—
the representation of any percept can potentially be linked to
the representation of any concept, and the links can change
very rapidly. So there are innumerable possible links. This
is compounded by the fact that there are infinitely many
incrementally different vocal forms that we can produce and
perceive, and an untold number of possible concepts/signifieds
because DR systems introduce a detachment from the immediate
situation that opens the door to any imaginable situation,
presented from a multitude of perspectives. Moreover, there
is the logical possibility that individuals will choose different
linkings: in the extreme case, each individual would have its own
system. Therefore, DR systems introduce an unprecedented sort
of chaotic system in the brain. This creates randomness that is
confronted with material constraints. As in other situations far
from equilibrium, small chance disturbances are progressively
amplified bymaterial properties and result in clusterings, in order
out of chaos (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984).
In this kind of self-organization, local interactions of
components of a system generate complex organized structures
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on a global scale. In language, the potential chaotic dispersions
of arbitrary signs are constrained by the physical and cognitive
properties with which the signs are confronted. These constraints
restrict the linguistic sign system in a way that maximizes
contrastive dispersion and creates clusterings that result in the
various properties of language that we observe in phonology,
semantics, and morphosyntax.
Phonological Segments
The signifier/percept of a sign is the part most noticeably
influenced by material properties. Though the representation
of any percept at all could in theory become a signifier, the
possibilities of the chaotic system are considerably narrowed by
material properties of our production systems and perception
systems.
A salient property of human vocalizations is that they are
perceived as segments: discrete elements. This is a general design
feature of human neurophysiology: information that unfolds over
time is chunked in the acoustic domain, as well as in other
domains such as vision. This is a bilateral stimulus-neutral system
of temporal segmentation that operates before feeding specialized
lateralized systems such as the processing of speech or music
(Poeppel, 2001). Sensory input is analyzed on different timescales
by the two hemispheres. High-pass (global) information from
short 20- to 50-ms temporal integration windows is passed
to left hemisphere areas, whereas low-pass (local) information
from long 150- to 250-ms integration windows is passed to the
right hemisphere (Poeppel, 2001) (However, the issue is still
unclear and recent work shows that lateralization in this case
may be weak; Giraud and Poeppel, 2012). These oscillations
arise naturally in our perception of vocalizations (Poeppel, 2003;
Sanders and Poeppel, 2007), and the temporal integration of
vocalizations is reflected as oscillatory neuronal activity. The
timings correspond to typical segments and syllables.
Similar, bilateral segmentation systems appear to be shared
by other species; they are the basis of the auditory processing
of species-specific vocalizations in macaque monkeys, and the
ability of squirrel monkeys to discriminate between conspecific
and non-conspecific vocalizations (according to studies reported
in Poeppel, 2001). This timing ability is the basis of a
system with an important adaptive benefit: a strong change
in rhythm signals danger. In sum, we perceive sound as
segments, in a digital, not analog way. Segments are perceived
as being produced concatenated. An important question is
what determines the particular repertoire of possible phonemes.
Why do digitized vocal percepts cluster in a few particular
hot spots among the innumerable, chaotic possibilities we can
produce and perceive? As in other chaotic systems, the clusterings
depend on frequency and accumulation: chance vocalizations are
progressively amplified by material properties pertaining to ease
of production and distinctness of perception. On the production
side, vocalizations involve the displacement of organs, hence
muscular energy. Certain vocalizations are easier to pronounce
and require less energy; this is likely to favor their use and
increase their frequency (Lindblom, 1992).
The human perceptual systems also set upper bounds on
the distinctions that we can perceive or produce as signifiers.
Distinctness of expression is particularly important in the case
of acoustic information since it is only physically available for
a very short length of time and cannot be recovered in the
case of an erroneous perception. Nowak et al. (2002) found
that the demands of discriminability (as well as memory and
time to learn) constrain the system to a fairly small set of
signals, an observation already made by Wang (1976, p. 61). The
actual repertoire is very small: a few dozen discrete perceptual
elements. This observation extends to sign languages that use the
gestural modality: there are very few gestural minimal elements,
and like phonemes, they are made up of articulatory features
(see, for instance, Brentari, 2002). This small set of percepts
is a result of self-organization. Vocalizations that are easier to
produce and can be more distinctly perceived have a higher
frequency of use. As frequencies increase, accumulations occur at
certain points in the articulatory–acoustic continuum. Percepts
cluster in particular hot spots as a result of this contrastive
dispersion. As Lindblom (1992) (following Liljencrants and
Lindblom, 1972) indicates, a compromise between perceptual
distinctiveness and articulatory cost brings about quasi-optimal
perceptual distinctiveness. But this is not sufficient, because
the search space is too large for convergence on a structure
as complex as the human phonological system. However, if
we take into account the properties of building materials, self-
organization derives the phonemic clusters. Thus, Carré and
Mrayati (1990) and Oudeyer (2005, 2006, 2007) show that
canalization by the vocal tract and general acoustic theory define
“eight discrete regions of such a tube where deformations, or
constrictions, afford greatest acoustic contrast for least articulator
effort” (Studdert-Kennedy, 2005, p. 64), and these correspond to
places of articulation in natural languages. Thus, vocalic systems
most frequently have peripheral vowels, which are the most
contrasted (Ménard, 2013).
Phonological Combinations
This severe limitation on the number of usable percepts
is the source of the clash between the possibilities of the
perceptual and conceptual substances. There are innumerable
meanings and ways to partition meaning (more on this
below), but discriminable speech sounds are limited by the
material properties of sound production and perception. The
combinatorial formation of signifiers is usually attributed to this
clash between the possibilities of the two systems. “If the symbols
were holistic vocalizations like primate calls, even a thousand
symbols would be impossible to keep distinct in perception
and memory” (Jackendoff, 2002, p. 242). In simulations like
Oudeyer’s, the small number of clusters “automatically brings
it about that targets are systematically re-used to build the
complex sounds that agents produce: their vocalizations are now
compositional” (Oudeyer, 2005, p. 444). How could that be?
Where do the compositional processes come from? The answer
is again found in the material properties already present in
the forms. Vocal units have the following universal material
properties:
_ they occur in time, so they can be ordered and juxtaposed;
_ they can have various intonations;
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_ they can be shortened or lengthened;
_ they can be stressed or unstressed.
These acoustic and auditory properties are also distinguishing
elements in the signals of other mammals (Lieberman, 1968).
Vocalizations occur in time, and the material properties of
vocal articulators are such that we cannot produce more than one
vocal unit at a time. This is a contingent property of language
production. Since vocal units are aligned in time, our perceptual
system captures the linear properties of vocalizations when they
are produced, in particular the linear relationship between two
vocal units, the most salient one being linear adjacency. The
linear adjacency of two vocal percepts is itself a percept and
can be represented by a DR system, like any other percept.
The relational percept of juxtaposition is already in the stock
of our perceptual system; hence, it is available for DR systems
that link concepts and percepts. Another material property of
vocalizations is intonation; therefore, another perceptual element
represented by DR systems is the tone superimposed on a vocal
unit, of which there are a few distinctive values due to contrastive
dispersion. Similarly, the length and stress of a segment are
percepts that can be represented by DR systems, within the limits
of distinctive values. Crucially, in an arbitrary system, the percept
represented by a DR system and linked to a concept can be any
element among those recognized by the perceptual system: a
vocal unit, a juxtaposition of units, an intonation, a length, or
a stress. Because the system is arbitrary, it makes no difference
whether the represented element is simple or complex. The
acoustic image can be a single phoneme or the relational percept
of juxtaposition applying any number of times to phonemes,
as well as any of the available distinctive intonations, lengths,
and stresses on these elements. These complex elements remain
within the limits of what humans can distinctively perceive
or produce because their parts have the appropriate qualities.
Phonological combinatoriality comes from a material property
of the articulatory and perceptual systems, namely the fact that
vocalizations are temporally linearized, which entails the percept
of juxtaposition. The phonetic data provide information on the
source of more abstract principles: segmenting into phonemes, as
well into as words/morphemes, already contains computational
properties (see DeWitt and Rauschecker, 2011 for combinatorial
properties in basic perception). This simple concatenation-
recursion of phonemes allows an unlimited derivation of
signifiers: any combination of distinguishable percepts can be
a signifier. This system is subject to a general law of nature
whereby the frequency of an element is inversely correlated with
its complexity: the simpler an element is, the more likely it is to
appear in nature (cf. Zipf, 1965/1949). Though concatenation-
recursion of phonemes can derive infinitely complex signifiers,
the simpler ones are much more likely to be formed, produced,
or heard. This higher frequency creates accumulations that make
the system relatively conservative in terms of the number and
complexity of elements that form its signifiers. In addition,
production ease and auditory salience influence not only the
dispersion of vowels and consonants, but also syllabic templates,
or sequences of segments: the combinations of phonemes are
subject to phonotactic constraints, such as the energy expended
for the transition, which also constrain the nature and number
of potential signifiers. The constraints that arise from properties
of the articulators and ease of articulation influence what
phonemes occur in adjacent positions as early as babbling
(MacNeilage and Davis, 2000). The overall complexity of a
signifier is also likely to be limited by memory and retrieval
capacities.
Discrete speech sounds and their combinations emerged
because they are consequences of material laws that apply to a
certain kind of organism hosting DR systems that can represent
elements of their perceptual and conceptual systems and links
between them. The chaotic system deriving from these brain
systems must have the properties that we observe because
the building materials channel the way the system becomes
structured into specific self-organizations.
Contrastive Dispersion of Meanings and
Combinatorial Semantics
Segmentation is also a design feature of the human cognitive
make-up. We digitize the world and events into discrete chunks,
action packages varying from 0.3 to 12 s, mostly 1 to 4 s
long (Schleidt and Kien, 1997). As for the ontology of the
cognitive units, our perceptual attention systems treat the world
as containing two basic kinds of entities (Hurford, 2007a, p.
527):
1. objects (“something is there”);
2. properties of these objects (“what is there” “what is happening
to it”).
Another aspect of cognitive segmentation is found in the
two types of attention discussed by Humphreys (1998).
Global attention captures the gist of the whole scene. In
language, this corresponds to something like the main
predicate and its arguments. Local attention is subsequent
focal attention on local features of individual objects. In
language, this corresponds to secondary predicates such as
nouns, adjectives, etc.
By allowing detachment, DR systems introduce a chaotic
expansion on the meaning side of language: there is an
extremely large if not infinite number of potential (oﬄine)
concepts. First, the vast number of objects and situations
we perceive can all be represented oﬄine as concepts, as
well as their properties. This is compounded by the various
perspectives we can have on them (Quine, 1960). Moreover, the
potential for concept formation is multiplied by the affordance
of intra-brain interactions where some neuronal systems are
triggered by other brain events. In addition, a particular
language can partition the conceptual substance in countless
possible ways to delimit its lexical meanings (Saussure’s radical
arbitrariness). In a system of arbitrary signs, any of these
elements treated by the cognitive system could be a meaning
represented by DR systems and could be linked to a vocal
form.
But this unbridled expansion in meanings is constrained
by design features of our cognition. For instance, our global
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attention process is constrained as to the number of participants
that it can take in at a glance: we can subitize at most four
salient objects at a time (cf. the “magical number 4” in Hurford,
2007b). Though actual events can involve any number of actants,
the chaos of what we observe is organized by subitizing and
chunks of four or fewer actants. The recurrence of the perception
of these chunks in the environment creates accumulations, and
language has settled on predicates with at most four arguments.
The chaotic expansion that could potentially arise from linguistic
arbitrariness in the meanings of words is also limited in a more
general way by material properties and self-organization. Here,
too, order arises out of chaos and clusters are formed in the
mass of the conceptual substance as a result of frequency and
accumulation. In this case, accumulation depends on thematerial
conditions that make the situations denoted by the concept
relevant for the organisms. The more a situation has some
importance and/or is encountered frequently by the organism,
the more frequently concepts associated with it will be activated.
The accumulations self-organize around the concepts most used
by the organism. It is this usefulness that makes the meanings
tend to correspond to fairly broad and/or usual categories of
things, actions, qualities, etc. (an observation already found
in Locke, 1690/1964, p. 15). Similarly, Nowak et al. (2002, p.
2131) note that “[t]he evolutionary optimum is achieved by
using only a small number of signals to describe a few valuable
concepts.”
Usefulness is also the motivation for the important role
played by basic level concepts (Rosch and Mervis, 1975; Rosch
et al., 1976). Murphy and Lassaline (1997) argue that the basic
level is an optimal compromise between informativeness and
distinctiveness: this level is informative, because we can infer
many unobserved properties once we know which basic category
something belongs to, and distinctive because it is a relatively
easy categorization to make. Thus, if you ask someone What are
you sitting on?, you are more likely to get the answer chair rather
than a subordinate such as kitchen chair or a superordinate such
as furniture. Names for basic-level concepts are among the first
common nouns learned by children (Brown, 1958).
In fact, we can construct so many particular objects and
events and their properties out of reality, potentially an infinite
number, that it would not be useful (in a general as well as in an
evolutionary sense) since most of them recur only very rarely, if
at all. This is likely why meanings tend to converge on these hot
spots of accumulation.
Even with an important number of U-signs and the possibility
of combining them by means of C-signs, the resulting meanings
are nevertheless generally quite broad and may correspond to
several different situations in the world, including the meanings
of sentences. Trying to remedy this underdetermination would
force language into ever more complex constructions, to a point
where it would be extremely unwieldy. Humans have another
prior mental attribute that avoids this problem and favors
the cumulative use of broad concepts: a system of pragmatic
inferences that derives from a full Theory of Mind (ToM). Given
the pragmatic inferences that derive from ToM and the context of
utterances, expressions need not have fully determined meanings
in order to convey information that is sufficiently precise to
be of current use. When two human beings interact, they each
have a full ToM, similar cognitive and perceptual systems, and
similar contextual information. Therefore, they both know that
they have an enormous amount of information in common, and
their language faculty does not operate in a vacuum. Using and
understanding language involves intensive reliance by speakers
on their shared conceptual and contextual knowledge. Pragmatic
theories from authors as diverse as Ducrot (1984), Grice (1975),
Levinson (2000), and Sperber and Wilson (1986) all share this
observation that comprehension is inferential and it draws on
both sentence meaning and context (in a very broad sense). Since
the inferential system is independently grounded, languages do
not drift into an unbridled multiplication of meanings redundant
with contextual information, but converge on broad, sufficiently
informative meanings (Bouchard, 1995; Hoefler, 2009). A similar
argument can be made from the perspective of language’s other
main function, i.e., thought organization.
To sum up, discrete meanings are clusters formed in the mass
of the conceptual substance as a result of maximizing contrastive
dispersion across the space for signifieds under the effects
of frequency and accumulation due to relevance/usefulness.
These clusters are relatively few in number and signs tend
to have fairly broad meanings. This does not adversely affect
the communicative or thinking functions of language because
linguistic signs reside in organisms that independently have
an inferential system that supplies the required complementary
information.
Syntax
The Source of Syntax
Syntactic combination of words and phrases raises the
same question as phonological concatenation. Where do
the combinatorial tools come from?
If we try to determine what brain systems enable the formal
properties of syntactic combinations and the plausibility of these
systems given known laws of evolution, it is likely that we will
not get very far, because formal systems are only very remotely
related to factors involved in evolutionary changes. The system
that forms signs (lexicon) and the system that combines signs
(syntax) have properties that are so different in current models
that they seem quite disconnected. For instance, Chomsky (1995,
p. 8) says that matters concerning “the sound–meaning pairing
for the substantive part of the lexicon [...] appear to be of limited
relevance to the computational properties of language.” But that
is not so in the approach I adopt. If we look at the physiological
and cognitive properties of the elements being combined, a
hypothesis emerges with means and a method of confirmation
that are clear enough to be verifiable. Since I argue that the syntax
of a language is a set of particular combinatorial signs, each with
its signified and signifier, I change the ontology of syntax from
a formal computational system to a set of neurophysiological
elements.
Syntactic compositional processes, i.e., C-signs, are simply
functional uses of universal pre-existing properties of vocal
sounds and universal pre-existing properties of our cognitive
system. Combinatorial syntax is due to the self-organization of
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these prior vocal and cognitive elements. On the conceptual
side, the most frequently represented element is the relation
of predication, since it is common to all the attributions of
properties. This is compounded by the fact that human brains
with DR systems have extended this cognitive process: DR
systems can not only attribute properties from sensory inputs to
perceived objects but, by operating oﬄine, they can also attribute
abstract conceptual properties, not linked to immediate sensory
inputs. Predication is the broad meaning par excellence. It is
a relation that is broad enough to apply to almost all possible
meanings and it is omnipresent in our cognitive system. So it
is the meaning that creates by far the strongest concentration
point in the chaos of semantic DR systems. The fact that
our linguistic system has integrated the predicative function
at its core simply reflects the place of this readily exaptable
concept in our cognitive system, its high rate of frequency and
accumulation.
On the perceptual-physical side, words being made of
concatenated phonemes, i.e., of elements with properties of vocal
sounds, the most frequent elements are temporal sequencing,
and superimposition such as intonation, stress, and length.
These traits are always present, so they are by far the most
frequent elements in the vocal perceptual system. Thus, the
hottest accumulation point in the mass of the conceptual
substance is the relational concept of predication, and the hottest
accumulation points in the mass of the perceptual substance are
the two relational percepts of juxtaposition and superimposition.
These accumulation points are so overwhelmingly dominant
in their respective domains that they increase the frequency
of links involving them to the point where these links
inevitably accumulate and crystallize. It follows that when human
organisms develop signs due to properties of their prior DR
systems, they inescapably develop combinatorial signs involving
predication as a meaning and juxtaposition and/or one of the
forms of superimposition as a signifier. In short, syntax is a
consequence of self-organization arising out of the chaos created
by DR systems, as is the linguistic sign.
Syntactic combination arises from prior properties of the
conceptual and perceptual substances involved, given general
laws of nature concerning highly complex systems, à la Prigogine
and Zipf. These cognitive and material design properties have a
very strong canalizing effect. In particular, they are all primitive
combinatorial processes: predication combines an object and
its property; order and juxtaposition hold of two segments;
intonation, length, and stress apply to segments. As a result, the
sign itself introduces combinatorial systems into the linguistic
system, and from these primitive combinatorial systems derive
concatenation in phonology and combination in syntax. The
logically prior properties of the physical and conceptual
components of signs are the source of key design features of
language, including the particular type of combinatorial system
that it has. Syntax happens to have functional effects that are
useful for communication and thought, but they are not the
factors that triggered its emergence; they are just fortunate
consequences.
Type-recursion
In addition to concatenation-recursion, as found in
phonology, the syntax of human language exhibits a
particular kind of recursion, where an element of type X
can be embedded within other X elements indefinitely.
I refer to this as type-recursion. We want to know not
only why language has recursion, but also why it has
type-recursion.
Type-recursion involves more than recognizing nested
attributes of objects (an ability that some animals have) (Penn
et al., 2008, p. 117). To have type-recursion, you need an
additional property: the complex signs must have a label; they
must belong to a category. If a phrase did not have a labeled
category, it could not contain another phrase of the same
category.
Since properties of signifiers are essentially those of
phonological elements, the types cannot come from these.
The source of the typological distinction must be in the
signified/meaning. Whether these categories are determined
ontologically or functionally is an important question that
has been debated for centuries. I will not address it here
since it is tangential to the issue. I will simply assume the
broad hypothesis that lexical items have categories when
they interact in syntax. It is also broadly assumed that the
phrasal categories are identical to the lexical categories (Noun,
Verb, Adjective, Preposition, Tense, etc.). This is due to the
fact that syntactic phrases are endocentric: the category of
a phrase always comes from one distinctive component,
which we refer to as the head—ultimately a lexical head, a
U-sign.
The syntactic properties of headedness and endocentricity
derive from prior properties. First, asymmetries in syntactic
relations, such as the asymmetry between heads and dependents,
come from the fact that predication, the meaning of C-signs,
is asymmetrical (Venneman, 1974; Keenan, 1978; Bouchard,
2002): the property expressed by the dependent is attributed
to the head. Second, endocentricity derives from the way we
cognitively process property-attribution (predication): in our
cognitive perception of the world, an object to which we attribute
a property remains an element of the same type; in a way,
it remains the same object. In language, this means that a
noun to which we add an adjective remains a nominal thing;
a verb to which we add an argument remains a verbal thing,
etc. There is a kind of hyperonymic relation between the head
and the phrase (cf. Bauer, 1990; Croft, 1996). Assuming the
parsimonious hypothesis that the only syntactic primitives are
lexical and combinatorial signs, we derive the Endocentricity
Theorem:
(8) Endocentricity Theorem
The category of a constituent X is the category of the element
that receives a property by the predication of the C-sign that
formed X.
In other words, if X is formed by a C-sign that assigns the
property of A to B, then X’s category is the category of B (B being
the “object” that receives the property of A).
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We now see why language has type-recursion: type-
recursion occurs whenever a restraining sign or one of its
elements happens to be of the same type as the restrained
sign whose category projects and determines the category
of the complex sign. Type-recursion is a side effect of
the combinatorial properties of the substances of signs,
interacting with a general cognitive principle of property
attribution.
Combinatorial syntax is not a hard-wired property that has
evolved at some time. This ability ultimately derives from
the particular representational capacity of DR systems that
allows the formation of signs. Discrete infinity is a side effect
of limitations on chaotic systems like arbitrary language, in
interaction with material properties of the sensory-motor and
conceptual substances. Both concatenation-recursion and type-
recursion derive from the resulting self-organization that takes
place. The reason that other animals do not have anything
like combinatorial syntax in their communication systems is
that they do not have DR systems, which also explains why
they do not have unit-signs/words. The crucial leap for a
language-ready brain was the development of DR systems
that enable the linking of elements of two substances with
no logical or natural connection between their elements, so
that the linking is purely symbolic. The sole distinctive trait
of human language is the capacity to form Saussurean signs.
Recursion and discrete infinity are just side effects of this
trait.
The ontology of syntax is not a formal computational system,
but a set of neurophysiological elements. These elements have
high evolvability, in contrast with formal systems. Interestingly,
it is by attributing a non-central place to recursion that we can
explain how language became type-recursive. My account is in
the spirit of Evo-Devo proposals: type-recursion is not due to
a specific genetic change but to logically prior properties of the
building materials of language.
The Sign Theory of Language has high evolvability with
respect to signs and combinatoriality. But of course, a linguistic
theory must also pass the test of accounting for the collection
of properties that linguists have uncovered about language. I am
fully aware that if I am tomake the radical claim that syntax is just
a small set of C-signs determined by the nature of the sensory-
motor and conceptual substances, I must show how that proposal
can account for the numerous claims made about the syntax of
human languages over the years. Space limitations prevent me
from doing that here. But the linguistically inclined reader will
find a long discussion in Part IV of Bouchard (2013) that tackles
a representative sample of some of the constructions that have
been most influential for theoretical argumentation over several
decades:
- subject-auxiliary inversion and structure dependence;
- binding conditions on referential relations;
- existential there-constructions;
- subject raising constructions;
- long distance dependencies and bounding conditions.
In addition, Bouchard (2002) analyses the distribution and
interpretation of adjectives in French and English in exquisite
detail, as well as bare noun phrases and bare determiners
(clitics).
In all these cases, the unification proposed in STL
leads to new insights that allow us to progress in our
understanding of language. Many properties that we
know about make sense in this model, whereas they just
existed, were described but left unaccounted for, in classic
models.
Conclusion
We must understand precisely what language is and have well
defined linguistic phenotypes to search for the neural substrates
that enable these phenotypes.
From a linguistic perspective, there are strong reasons
to assume that the central trait of human language is the
capacity to form signs by linking perceptual forms and
meanings, rather than the currently prominent view that
puts computational tools with discrete infinity at the core
of language. Recursive syntax turns out to be a side effect
of sign formation: due to general principles, an organism
that develops signs inevitably develops combinatorial signs.
The Sign Theory of Language offers a comprehensive and
unifying approach to the functioning of the main subsystems
of language: by calling on the perceptual and conceptual
substances of signs and the self-organization that it triggers,
the theory explains specific properties of signs, as well as the
basic structuring of language in its phonology, semantics, and
syntax.
This change of perspective regarding linguistic phenotypes
suggests to direct research on neural substrates that enable meta-
representational functionalities, detached from sensory input
and motoric output. Such Detached Representational systems
need not be language specific. Given biological continuity, it
is likely that the neural mechanisms will have broad effects at
the functional level. While looking for the neural substrates
that enable the formation of linguistic signs, it may therefore
be useful to consider possible effects of these substrates on
non-linguistic traits that may also depend on DR systems,
such as the traits discussed under the Human-specific Adaptive
Suite.
Another important question in probing the language-ready
brain in adults is how much of the mechanisms are in place at
birth and how much of the language system takes form during
infant development.
My hope is that the change in perspective that we are led to
from purely linguistic considerations will enlighten the search
for the neural substrates of language, so we will eventually have a
better understanding of what makes, and made, the human brain
language-ready.
The general outline of the model is as follows:
(9) Figure 3
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Detached Representation Systems
offline representation of percepts (ORP) offline representation of concepts (ORC)
links between ORPs and ORCs
signs
segmentation of percepts segmentation of world/events
vocal forms order discrete concepts predication
superimpositions
self-organization self-organization
clusterings phonological broad meanings
phonemes combinations
most frequent ORPs most frequent ORC
(order, superimpositions) (predication)
self-organization
combinatorial signs syntax
(categorization, endocentricity)
type-recursion:
FIGURE 3 | General outline of the model. Detached Representation Systems produce offline representations of percepts (ORP) and offline representations of
concepts (ORC). Links between ORPs and ORCs create linguistic signs. These signs have restricted traits because the prior properties of the substances of percepts
and concepts severely constrain them. The segmentation of percepts produces a potentially infinite set of vocal forms; these forms undergo self-organization that
creates clusterings that result from frequency and accumulation due to ease of production and distinctness of perception: this delimits the set of potential phonemes
for languages. The segmentation of percepts also introduces order and superimposition (intonation, length, stress), which derive phonological combinations. The
segmentation of world/events produces a potentially infinite set of discrete concepts; these concepts undergo self-organization that creates clusterings that result
from frequency and accumulation due to relevance/usefulness for the organism: this delimits the set of broad meanings for languages. Concepts fall in two broad
classes, objects and properties, the latter introducing the notion of predication in a broad sense. The most frequent ORP elements are order and superimposition, and
the most frequent ORC element is predication. These accumulation points are so overwhelmingly dominant in their respective domains that they increase the
frequency of links involving them to the point where these links inevitably develop into combinatorial signs (syntax). Given categorization and endocentricity (due to
object permanence), the syntax of languages has the formal property of type-recursion.
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